PROMOTING INCLUSION THROUGH EXCLUSION: HIGHER
EDUCATION’S ASSAULT ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Adam Lamparello
“Free speech and a constructive climate for learning are not incompatible.”1

INTRODUCTION
Higher education is becoming the modern day Gestapo.
Most would agree that faculty members at universities across the country should not be permitted to make racial, prejudicial, stereotypical, and
highly offensive comments in the classroom toward individual students or
groups. The difficult question is delineating the line between unpopular
speech that offends members of the student and academic community, and
unpopular speech that, while offensive, must be tolerated as part of classroom and university discourse.2
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Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
Eric Owens, Washington State U. SMACKS DOWN Professors Who Want to CENSOR Politically-Incorrect
Language,
THE
DAILY
CALLER
(Sept.
1,
2015),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/01/washington-state-u-smacks-down-professors-who-want-tocensor-politically-incorrect-language/; see also Justin Wm. Moyer, Washington State University
Class Bans ‘Offensive’ Terms Like Male, Female, Tranny, Illegal Alien, Wash. Post Sept. 2,
2015,
http://tablet.washingtonpost.com/rweb/politics/college-class-bans-offensive-terms-likemale-female-tranny-illegal-alien/2015/09/02/1ae482a4257a6736a9dcb8b6f3a77875_story.html
(expanding more on the details of the speech policy).
The American Association of University Professors’ Statement on Academic Freedom, as well as
many university policies governing free speech, are riddled with ambiguities that fail to guide
administrators, faculty, and students. The AAUP statement on academic freedom provides as follows:
Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. . . . Teachers are entitled
to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject. . . . College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession,
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should
remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint,
should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate
that they are not speaking for the institution. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
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This essay argues that universities have gone too far in suppressing unpopular, even distasteful, speech that is accorded the highest degree of First
Amendment protection and that is vital to facilitating the robust exchange
of ideas and viewpoints among students and faculty. As discussed below,
university administrators have censored faculty members and, in some cases, adopted policies that discourage core political speech, discriminate
against speech on the basis of its content, and deter faculty and students
from expressing controversial views.
In so doing, many universities have manufactured artificial utopias
based on a philosophy of avoiding, not confronting, unpopular ideas, and of
pacifying, not empowering, students in the pursuit of knowledge. In this
way, some universities have become equivalent to the anxiety-riddled parent who shelters a child from the evils of the world, only to find out years
later that the child is woefully unprepared for life’s challenges. The same
result occurs when universities pamper, coddle, and over-react to the
whims of every hyper-sensitive student who would rather label a professor
or fellow student “insensitive” than engage in a constructive dialogue with
students and faculty who have different opinions. Students are unprepared
for the world they are about to enter, and the educational benefits of a diverse student body are compromised, if not entirely abandoned. Put differently, the fact that universities are “educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”3
Nowhere are free speech rights more important than in higher education. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when
students have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds,”4 and where
knowledge is acquired through “speculation, experiment and creation.”5 In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6 the United States Supreme Court held as
follows:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
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PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure available
at: http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure.
These and other policies provide minimal, if any, guidance to university personnel, and make it
likely that policies concerning free speech will be largely subjective and, in some case, motivated
by discrimination against particular viewpoints.
Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-65 (1982)
(quoting West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.7

When Universities over-regulate classroom speech by professors and
students, they engage in precisely what the First Amendment seeks to prevent, and prohibit precisely what the First Amendment seeks to foster: a
heterogeneous classroom environment in which students of all backgrounds
can express opinions without the fear of reprisal, without the threat of censure, and without the “pall of orthodoxy” that renders free speech an abstract, rather than concrete, right.8
The problem with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and university
policies governing free speech, is the exclusive focus on whether the faculty member’s speech warrants first amendment protection, and not on
whether a faculty member or student can actually prove that particular
speech or expressive conduct, even if protected, resulted in cognizable legal harm. This essay proposes a framework for evaluating the free speech
rights in higher education that is analogous, in part, to two prongs under the
standard for adjudicating sexual harassment jurisprudence under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. Under Title VII, employees are entitled to a workplace that is free of “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, [and] insult,”9
and may recover for sexual harassment where the employee was a member
of protected class, subject to unwanted sexual harassment based on sex that
“affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment,”10 and where the
employer failed to take remedial measures.11 By way of analogy, faculty
members and students should likewise be entitled to an educational environment that is free of discrimination, coercion and intimidation, but the
law (and university policies) should only provide a remedy where the
speech: (1) is subjectively and objectively unwelcome; (2) is offensive to
an individual of reasonable sensibilities; and (3) creates a hostile educational environment that is not conducive to the expression of different
views.12 In conducting this analysis, courts should consider, among other
things, the following factors:
The context in which the speech was made, including its pedagogical value
and relevance to the subject matter or course;
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Id. at 603 (emphasis added)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
Linville v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 335 F.3d 822, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003). Importantly, students
would not be required to show that they are members of a protected class, as all students, regardless of their background, are entitled to a welcome and stable educational environment.
See id.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (listing the factors needed in order
to sustain an actionable sex discrimination claim).
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Whether the speech “unreasonably interferes with a [student’s] work performance,”13 which entails a focus on whether a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities would find the speech offensive and unwelcome; and
Whether the speech was targeted at specific students or groups.

Of course, given the fact that students often do not have the means or
desire to file legal actions against their universities, this standard would be
less stringent that that governing Title VII claims. In addition, it would not
prevent universities from enforcing “reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations”14 on certain types of speech. In doing so, this standard would
strike a more appropriate chord than many current university policies,
which err on the side of suppressing, rather than encouraging, protected
speech. Indeed, students and faculty members should not be allowed to
complain about speech that, although personally offensive or distasteful,
would not be offensive to the reasonable person.15 Furthermore, although a
university has a duty to protect students from offensive speech that has
minimal pedagogical educational value, speech policies should not become
a “general civility code,”16 or promote an educational climate that is based
largely on the speculative harms that might result from controversial
speech or, worse, disagreement with a speaker’s viewpoint. Such an approach would undermine, rather than encourage, the free flow of ideas, and
make the classroom more, not less, divorced from the real world.
Part II discusses troubling developments in higher education that have
led to the over-policing of speech, and over-reaction to students claiming to
be “offended” by a faculty member’s speech inside the classroom. Part III
argues that courts and universities should adopt a new framework for evaluating analogous to Title VII sex discrimination claims when inquiring
whether a faculty member’s speech warrants legal protection. Ultimately,
“the comprehensive authority . . . of school officials” must be exercised
“consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,”17 and that should
require universities to embrace, not shun, all viewpoints, and to encourage,
not eradicate, speech with which some, or even most, may disagree.
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Id. at 787–88.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
Of course, there will be instances in which speech that would not be grounds for a cognizable
claim under this standard would still be considered offensive to a reasonable person. For example, a statement to an Asian person that “You must be good at math,” could certainly be viewed
as offensive and should be discouraged, but it should not be the basis upon which to fire faculty
members or label someone “racist.” See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
273 (1988) (school officials may restrict some speech on the basis of content if it is “reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). A standard analogous to that used in Title VII sex
discrimination claims can provide a baseline by which university administrators can address free
speech issues and respond proportionately and fairly to complaints.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (internal quotation omitted).
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
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II. INCLUSION THROUGH EXCLUSION: UNDERMINING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THWARTING THE FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS
The purpose of obtaining a college or graduate degree is not merely to
acquire knowledge. Students must learn to apply that knowledge to realworld situations and interact with people of diverse backgrounds and beliefs. The over-regulation of speech is entirely inconsistent with this objective.
A. The Core Purpose of Higher Education
Higher education provides students with to the opportunity to collectively discover truth “out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection,”18 and connects classroom discourse to
the diverse perspectives students will encounter in the real world. One
commentator states as follows:
Attempts to shield students from words, ideas, and people that might cause
them emotional discomfort are bad for the students. They are bad for the
workplace, which will be mired in unending litigation if student expectations of
safety are carried forward. And they are bad for American democracy, which
is already paralyzed by worsening partisanship. When the ideas, values, and
speech of the other side are seen not just as wrong but as willfully aggressive
toward innocent victims, it is hard to imagine the kind of mutual respect, negotiation, and compromise that are needed to make politics a positive-sum game.
Rather than trying to protect students from words and ideas that they will inevitably encounter, colleges should do all they can to equip students to thrive in a
world full of words and ideas that they cannot control. One of the great truths
taught by Buddhism (and Stoicism, Hinduism, and many other traditions) is
that you can never achieve happiness by making the world conform to your desires. But you can master your desires and habits of thought. This, of course,
is the goal of cognitive behavioral therapy. With this in mind, here are some
steps that might help reverse the tide of bad thinking on campus.19

In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,20 the Court noted that
“law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the
law interacts,” and “removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange
of views with which the law is concerned.”21 Concerning medical school,
the Court noted that “[p]hysicians serve a heterogeneous population,” and
“[a]n otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background—
18
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, THE ATLANTIC, Sept.
2015, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-theamerican-mind/399356/.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 314 (internal citation omitted).
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whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged—
may bring . . . ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better
equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”22 Simply put, if the inclusion of controversial topics and exchange of controversial beliefs is prohibited, no university can make the
claim that it is inclusive.
In recent years, however, Universities have adopted policies that result
in the suppression of speech on matters of political and social importance,
and that reflect the diversity of the classroom environment. The stated reason for such policies—to foster an inclusive educational environment and
eliminate intolerant, divisive, and offensive speech—is the height of hypocrisy. These policies discourage faculty members from expressing unpopular views, inhibit rigorous classroom discussion on matters of social importance, and over-react to the hyper-sensitivities of students who would
rather avoid, than confront, topics and opinions they find distasteful. In so
doing, universities are achieving an artificial atmosphere of “inclusion”
through exclusion, undermining free speech values, and undercutting the
education values of diversity.
B. Over-Sensitizing the Academic Environment: Misguided Attempts to
Suppress Speech
1. Discouraging “Microaggressions”
Microagressions, which are facially innocuous statements that purportedly contain insensitive underlying messages, are the newest rave in higher
education’s mission to pacify even the most sensitive minds. For example,
the University of California at Berkeley recently issued a memorandum to
professors discouraging the used of what it calls “microagrressions.” For
example, Berkeley has discouraged faculty from making statements such
as:
“Men and women have equal opportunities for achievement.”
“I believe the most qualified person should get the job.”
“America is a melting pot.”
“Why are you so quiet?”23
22
23

Id.
Recognizing Microagressions
and the
Messages
They Send,
available at
http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnelprograms/_files/seminars/Tool_Recognizing_Microaggressions.pdf; see also Robby Soave, The
University of California’s Insane Speech Police, THE DAILY BEAST, June 22, 2015, available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/22/the-university-of-california-s-insane-speechpolice.html (reporting on the adverse effects that the UC Berkeley memorandum might have on
free speech).
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Admittedly, some speech that technically classifies as a “microagression” is insensitive and has questionable pedagogical value. The phrase
“You are a credit to your race,” can be understood by a reasonable person
to imply that the speaker views that race as inferior. Statements like these
have no pedagogical value and should be actively discouraged in the educational setting. Conversely, a statement such as “I think the most qualified
person should get the job” may reflect a merit-based philosophy and possibly opposition to affirmative action, but it certainly does not suggest animus or prejudice toward a racial or ethnic group. If anything, this statement suggests that the speaker does not support the use of affirmative
action in higher education. This may spark vehement disagreement, but it
certainly does not convey intolerance or create a hostile educational environment. When universities target this speech, regardless of their good intentions, the fear of reprisal for voicing such opinions is likely to have a
chilling effect on free speech.
2. Bans on Politically-Incorrect Speech by Faculty and Students
Some faculty members at Washington State University recently banned
students from using words like “[c]olored people,” and “[t]ranny” in the
classroom, on the grounds that these words can be offensive to many students [and] create an uncomfortable, if not hostile, classroom environment,
and respective dialogue.24
Furthermore, one professor at Washington State warned white students
that, “to do well in this class”25 and to reflect their “grasp of history and social relations” white students should defer “to the experiences of people of
color.”26 Yet another professor teaching a feminism course at Washington
State stated in her syllabus that students risked “failure for the semester”27
if they referred to men and women by the term “male” or “female.”28 Fortunately, Washington State University’s President intervened to warn faculty that such conduct was not consistent with fostering “[o]pen dialogue,
vigorous debate and the free exchange of ideas, as well as the language
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College Class Bans “Offensive” Words, THE J. GAZETTE (September 3, 2015),
http://www.journalgazette.net/news/us/College-class-bans—offensive—words-8574432. (brackets added).
Eric Owens, Washington State U. Smacks Down Professors Who Want to Censor PoliticallyIncorrect
Language,
DAILY
CALLER
(Sept.
1,
2015),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/01/washington-state-u-smacks-down-professors-who-want-tocensor-politically-incorrect-language/.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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used to convey these ideas,”29 all of which “are at the core of who we are as
a higher education institution.”30
Of course some of the above statements are undoubtedly offensive.
However, a blanket ban on statements that would typically be regarded as
offensive ignores the fact that some offensive statements have pedagogical
value and therefore will not create an unwelcome and hostile classroom environment. When faced with complaints about such speech, universities
should consider the purpose for which these words were uttered, such as
where a faculty member or student is quoting from a book or recalling a
traumatic incident, and assess their relevance to the course’s subject matter.
3. Bans on “Divisive” Speech
Moreover, some universities actively ban speech that strives to spark
public debate on matters of public interest. The University of Iowa recently removed a seven-foot statute depicting a Ku Klux Klan robe covered
with articles concerning racial tensions over the last century.31 The artwork
was intended to remind students of the horrors of racism, and to encourage
progressive dialogue on race relations.32 Notwithstanding, the University
of Iowa’s President branded the artist a racist, and made the following
statement:
The University of Iowa is a diverse community with no tolerance for racism,
and the artwork that was briefly displayed on the Pentacrest this morning was
deeply offensive to members of our community . . . . The University of Iowa
considers all forms of racism abhorrent and is deeply committed to the principles of inclusion and acceptance. There is no room for divisive, insensitive,
and intolerant displays on this campus.33

The last sentence highlights everything that is wrong with universities
that seek inclusion through the exclusion of speech to which the First
Amendment affords the highest protection. Furthermore, the university had
the audacity to label the artist a racist, thereby smearing his character and
ignoring the purpose of the artwork. In fact, it is the university officials,
not the artist, who are the poster children for division, insensitivity, and intolerance.

29
30
31

32
33

Id.
Owens, supra note 25.
Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech on Campus: The 10 Worst Offenders of 2014, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar.
2,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/10-worst-for-freespeech_b_6769564.html.
Id.
Email from Thomas R. Rocklin, Vice President for Student Life, U. of Iowa, to Students, Faculty
and Staff (Dec. 5, 2014, 14:03), available at https://www.thefire.org/email-thomas-r-rocklin-iucampus-community/.
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4. Bans on Innocuous Speech
In addition, the University of California-Fullerton flagrantly disregarded First Amendment freedoms when it accused a sorority of engaging in
“[d]isorderly, lewd, indecent, or obscene conduct”34 for holding an event
titled “Taco Tuesday,”35 in which members of the sorority wore sombreros
and Mexican clothing.36 The university forced the sorority to attend mandatory workshops on “cultural competencies and diversity,”37 even though
nothing in the record remotely suggested that the sorority members were
motivated by prejudice or intolerance. Similarly, Modesto Junior College
administrators prohibited a student from distributing copies of the United
States Constitution because the student was not standing within the college’s designated “free speech zone,”38 which consists of two relatively
small concrete areas on the college’s 225-acre campus.39 When a professor
at the college voiced support for the student, the college retaliated with a
negative job evaluation and restricted his course load.40
The obvious problem with banning facially innocuous speech, as well
as speech some might consider divisive, is that conclusions regarding the
quality and character of the speech are inescapably subjective. Given this
fact, universities should adopt policies that focus on the objective reasonableness of the speech, and not discourage or prohibit speech that some students might conceivably find offensive. This approach would recognize
that there will be moments in the classroom, as there will be in the real
world, where individuals will find speech distasteful. But it is precisely
this type of speech that permits students to learn from “the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds,”41 and to find enlightenment through “speculation,
experiment and creation.”42
5. Policies that Inhibit Protected Speech
Some universities have adopted policies that inhibit the free exchange
of ideas, including speech outside of the classroom. The University of
Kansas, for example, recently adopted a policy governing the faculty mem34
35
36
37
38
39

40
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Lukianoff, supra note 31.
Id.
Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech on Campus: The 10 Worst Offenders of 2014, (May 2, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/10-worst-for-free-speech_b_6769564.html.
Id.
Id.
Quarantining the Constitution: The Fight for Free Speech on a California Campus,
THEFIREORG
(June
25,
2014)
(published
on
YouTube),
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBMafvA-TFU.
See Lukianoff, supra note 31 (discussing the consequences for Professor Holly).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263).
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bers’ use of social media. The policy contains a paragraph prohibiting the
following speech that:
[I]mpairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the speaker’s official duties, interferes with the regular operation of the university, or otherwise adversely affects the university’s ability to efficiently provide services.43

The policy also provides that “the chief executive officer shall balance
the interest of the university in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees against the employee’s right as a
citizen to speak on matters of public concern.”44
6. Trigger Warnings
Relatedly, some universities have embraced the use of “trigger warnings,” which require professors to advise students in advance of sensitive
subject matter that will be discussed in class.45 Along with blanket bans on
specific words, these policies create an environment in which professors
and students must carefully watch their words for fear that the style or content of their utterances might “offend” someone, transgress a university
policy, or draw condemnation from faculty colleagues.
Although trigger warnings do not, on their face, appear to threaten free
speech rights, the philosophy underlying them is one of avoidance in which
students are permitted to opt out of classes where sensitive subjects are
taught. One commentator states as follows:
Some students have called for warnings that Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall
Apart describes racial violence and that F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby portrays misogyny and physical abuse, so that students who have been previously victimized by racism or domestic violence can choose to avoid these
works, which they believe might “trigger” a recurrence of past trauma. 46

Few would question the enduring and irreparable trauma that can result
from being victimized by racism and domestic violence. Thus, a trigger
warning can be a sensible tool by which to notify students in advance of
sensitive or potentially divisive topics. On the other hand, exempting students from specific classes or assignments can inhibit a constructive classroom dialogue about such topics, make it impossible for students from diverse backgrounds to discuss difficult issues openly, and prevent students

43

44
45
46

See Kansas Board of Regents, Proposed Revision to Board Policy, (Dec. 18-19, 2013) (emphasis
added),
available
at
http://worldonline.media.clients.ellingtoncms.com/news/documents/2013/12/18/discussion_agen
da_socialmediapolicy.pdf.
Id.
See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 19.
Id.
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from challenging the conscious or subconscious beliefs that they may harbor. Of course, professors must use discretion in every situation, particularly where a trauma is recent or the student is clearly unable to participate
meaningfully in a discussion. In most situations, however, trigger warnings
do not empower students. They allow them to retreat into the same false
utopia that aggressive regulations of faculty speech create.
III. A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT
DISPUTES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Admittedly, First Amendment protections do not apply equally in all
contexts. Free speech rights vary depending on the context within which
speech is uttered, and in some cases based on the content of the speech.47
Students have diminished free speech rights in public high schools to ensure a stable learning environment for all students. Likewise, universities
may–and should–regulate offensive, derogatory, prejudicial or distasteful
speech that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, but that
reflects prejudice toward individual students or groups.
In Healy v. James,48 the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, ‘(t)he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools.’ The college classroom with
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,” and we break
no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.49

It is disturbing that the wholesale suppression of speech to which the First
Amendment affords the highest constitutional protection is happening at
places like California-Berkeley, Washington State, the University of Iowa,
and the University of California-Fullerton. And these examples are not
anomalies. The new norm in higher education is to suppress speech on the
basis of its content while labeling faculty members and students “divisive,”
“insensitive,” or “intolerant.” That should change now. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as applied to claims of sexual harassment provides a principled framework for
resolving the free speech disputes in higher education, ironically, to focus
less on the First Amendment and more on the effect of the speech on the
audience. This encompasses an analysis of whether the speech at issue
47
48
49

See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist., 484 U.S. at 274 (noting that schools can regulate some speech
on the basis of content if it is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), Keyishian,
385 U.S. at 603 and Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249-50 (plurality opinion)).
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81.
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was: (a) objectively unwelcome; (2) offensive to an individual of ordinary
sensibilities; and (3) likely to create a hostile educational environment.
A. Whether the Speech was Objectively Unwelcome
In the context of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, the Court
has held that “not all workplace conduct that may be described as ‘harassment’ is, in fact, sexual harassment.”50 Furthermore, courts have “never
held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the
words used have sexual content or connotations.”51 In fact, a “recurring
point . . . is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
‘terms and conditions of employment.’”52 Furthermore, “not all profane
or sexual language or conduct will constitute discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment.”53 Rather, the harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”54
A similar principle should apply when assessing if speech at issue in the
university context is objectively unreasonable. Not all speech that could
conceivably be deemed “offensive” should be censored, and not all students who complain about a faculty member’s speech should be entitled to
a remedy, legal or otherwise. Instead, courts should consider, among other
things, the context within which the speech was made, including its pedagogical value and relevance to the subject matter. To illustrate, in Hardy v.
Jefferson Community College,55 the words “bitch,” “faggot,” and “nigger”
were used in a lecture discussing language and social constructivism, and
how “race, gender, and power conflicts in our society.”56 After one student
complained, the college refused to allow the professor to teach the course.57
The Sixth Circuit found in favor of the professor, holding that
“[r]easonable school officials should have known that such speech, when it
is germane to the classroom subject matter and advances an academic message, is protected by the First Amendment.”58 The Sixth Circuit’s holding
correctly recognized that if protected speech serves a valid and reasonable

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv’s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted).
Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. (quoting Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999)).
260 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 683.
Id.
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pedagogical purpose in light of a course’s subject matter, there is no basis
upon which to prohibit its expression.
This is not to say that universities cannot regulate other speech that the
Court has deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection, such as obscenity,59 or in appropriate instances restrict highly offensive speech that
would otherwise be protected if not made in a classroom or university context. However, discouraging faculty members from saying, “I think the
most qualified person should get the job,” prohibiting students from using
the words “male” or “female,” or penalizing a sorority for “Taco Tuesday”
is objectively unreasonable. Doing so does not promote inclusion and certainly does not facilitate the uninhibited exchange of ideas. Rather, it casts
a palpable chill over university communities by subtly coercing individuals
into silence based on the fear that their expressive conduct, regardless of
how innocent, sincere, or protected, can result in severe sanctions.
B. Whether the Speech Would Be Offensive to an Individual of Ordinary
Sensibilities
In the Title VII context, courts have routinely held that the standard for
assessing whether “harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter an employee’s terms or conditions of employment includes a subjective and an objective component.”60 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,61
the Supreme Court stated that “the objective severity of harassment should
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances,’”62 including a “careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.”63 By way of analogy, the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “the conduct. . .[is]
‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”64 Indeed, the fact that the “level of atrociousness to which [the behavior] must [rise] is quite high,”65 reflects the
proposition, as evident with the objective reasonableness requirement, that
59
60
61
62
63
64

65

See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-20 (1973) (holding that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment).
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
Reynolds v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 454 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harris v. Jefferson Partners, L.P., 653 N.W.2d 496, 500 (S.D. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
Skidmore v. Precision Printing And Packaging. Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Franklin v. Enserch, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 704, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1998)).
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not all harms or sensitivities should entitle individuals to a legal remedy or
motivate universities to suppress speech.
Courts—and higher education–should embrace this principle in the academic environment. To promote a climate where controversial ideas are
confronted, not avoided, and unpopular speech is welcomed, not shunned,
universities must accept that there will be opinions, statements, and other
forms of expressive activity that they find subjectively offensive. Thus, in
order to facilitate meaningful and realistic classroom dialogue, speech or
expressive conduct should not be regulated unless it is objectively offensive
to individuals of average sensibilities. For example, it may be uncomfortable to discuss rape in a criminal justice course, and it may be disturbing to
see images of the Ku Klux Klan in a multiculturalism course. That fact
alone, of course, does not make those images less real or history less accurate. Furthermore, the point of discussing rape or showing images of the
Ku Klux Klan is not to cause distress, but to spark dialogue so that students may learn through “speculation, experiment and creation”66 and
“thrive in a world full of words and ideas that they cannot control.”67
C. Whether the Speech Creates a Hostile Educational Environment
In the Title VII context, when examining if an employer’s conduct created a “hostile work environment,” courts consider “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”68 Moreover, the conduct
“must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person
would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that
the victim perceived it to be so.”69
A similar standard should apply to determine if a student or faculty
member’s expressions create a hostile educational environment. Of course
this would not mean that a single statement, if sufficiently severe, could not
be the basis for a university sanction or legal sanction. In making this determination, courts should consider, among other things, whether the
speech is targeted at specific individuals or groups, has a tendency to explicitly or implicitly discourage particular viewpoints, is relevant to the
66
67

68
69

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)
(internal quotation omitted).
THE
ATLANTIC,
supra
note
19,
available
at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-americanmind/399356/.
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (1993).
Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing
Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.1999)) (citing Harris, 510
U.S. at 21-22).
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subject matter being discussed, and is delivered in a professional manner.
The Table below provides a few examples of the types of offensive speech
that courts would likely permit and prohibit under this standard.70
STANDARD
The speech at issue
must be subjectively
and objectively
unwelcome, offensive
to a person of
reasonable
sensibilities, and
create a hostile
educational
environment

PERMITTED SPEECH
“I think gay
marriage is a sin”

“I think affirmative
action gives jobs to
unqualified people.”
“Can we just call
St. Patrick’s day the
white people’s
kwanzaa that it is.”71
“White people have
benefited from a long
history of
discrimination and
need a history lesson in
diversity.”
“People from
conservative
backgrounds are less
informed than others.”
“I think some
women who are raped
send a message that
they want to have sex.”

70
71

PROHIBITED
SPEECH
“Homosexuals are
evil”
“God hates fags”

“Minorities need
affirmative action
because they are
inferior human beings.”
“We should lynch
all white people.”
“All white people
are racist pigs.”

“People from
conservative
backgrounds are stupid
rednecks.”
“If a woman asks
for it, she gets what she
deserves.”

The statements in the “permitted” speech column should not be interpreted to suggest the author’s approval of them.

Joan Venocci, “BU Professor Teaches a Lesson in Offensive Speech,” (July 7, 2015), available at:
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/06/less-offensivespeech/VzTnGVA4XCNRXFZDXJgXrN/story.html.
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Constructively
criticizing students for
substandard
performance

[Vol. 18

Calling students
“dunderheads and ratlike” on social media72

CONCLUSION
To obtain a meaningful educational experience and achieve the benefits
of a diverse student body, students should confront beliefs they find abhorrent and discuss topics that bring discomfort. As it stands now, universities
are transforming classrooms and campuses into sanctuaries for the oversensitive and shelters for the easily-offended. In so doing, higher education
is embracing a new, and bizarre, form of homogeneity that subtly coerces
faculty members and students into restricting, not expressing, their views,
and creating a climate that favors less, not more, expressive conduct. This
approach undermines First Amendment values and further divorces higher
education from the real world.
The purpose of attending college or graduate school is not merely to
acquire knowledge or develop expertise in a chosen field. Students must
learn how to interact with people, how to cope with distasteful behavior,
and how to learn and respond to adversity. When universities avoid rather
than acknowledge the world in which we live, they implicitly cultivate a
mindset that views diversity as less, not more, desirable, and that shuns, rather than embraces, a true marketplace of ideas where all viewpoints are
welcomed. In a society that values democracy, autonomy, and individuality, nothing is more poisonous or antithetical to the pursuit of knowledge.

72

See, e.g., Munroe v. Central Bucks School Dist., No. 14-3509, 2015 WL 5167011 at *2-3 (September
4, 2015) (upholding the dismissal of a teacher who made harsh comments about her students on a social
media website).

